The Clock · Part 4
The Clock, Part 4: Why you should watch
Why the safe summer never existed, and what to watch by game 20.
This part is my case, and I'm a fan who wants it to be true. The model I built doesn't agree with it, and you should know that before you read it. So it starts with everything that could go wrong.
One check first, because the easy answer to why the model and Vegas disagree is Ant. I re-ran the model with him rated as the 10th-best player in the league in every version of it. Minnesota goes from 41.8 wins to 43.5, a quarter of the gap to Vegas's 48.5. That's a sensitivity, not a finding, and it says most of the gap is somewhere other than how the model rates Ant.
Minnesota's projected wins: the frozen model on the aged basis, as published, and the same model with one change, Edwards's rating, set in each of the four views to the 10th-best player's value in that view. His defense stays and his offense moves. Vegas is BetMGM's posted total. A sensitivity, not a finding. Hover a row.
Everything that could go wrong
Health. It's the biggest thing on this list, and LaMelo is in the middle of it. Part 2 ran the playoffs without each of them, one at a time. Without Ant, 68% of the title odds are gone. Without LaMelo, 62%. Without Rudy, 41%. The contenders have one player like that; Oklahoma City's season and San Antonio's each hang on one guy. Minnesota's hangs on two. In raw points it's a smaller stake, 1.19 points of title odds for Ant against 15.09 for Shai, because the Wolves have less to lose. As a share of what they have, it's bigger, and it grows in April, when the rotation shortens and every missing starter is a bigger slice of what's left.
Each bar is what a team loses when that player is out for the whole playoffs, his regular season unchanged: the share of its full-roster title odds, or the same loss in points of title odds. The aged basis, the mean over the headline views (the N5 removal run). The run took out each team's top three by minutes and its top three by impact; Minnesota's other rotation players weren't taken out, so they aren't here. Oklahoma City's and San Antonio's bars are each team's single largest loss. Hover a bar.
LaMelo's games. His six seasons in Charlotte, in games played: 51, 75, 36, 22, 47, 72. The last one is the good one, and it's the one the trade was made on. I went looking for what usually happens next to a player with a history like his, and the honest answer is that the history is thin. Twenty player-seasons since 2001-02 match it; their median was 61.4 games, and one in four reached 70. So the base rate isn't a prediction, it's a shrug with a number on it. The model already plans for about 61 of them. What I can tell you is what the games cost. Run the season with LaMelo playing 50 instead of 82, playoffs at full strength, and the title odds barely move, 0.13 points. The seed moves. The chance of a top-six finish drops 14.5 points, and a top-six finish is the difference between a first-round series and a play-in game against somebody who's been there before. His games decide where they start the playoffs, not whether they can win them. Whether he's on the floor in April does, and that's the 62% above.
Cody Williams. Part 2 made the whole offseason verdict turn on his minutes, so here's the short version. When he plays, his minutes come out of players the model trusts more, and whether the summer helped or hurt flips on how many he gets: without the age adjustment the summer turns negative once he's past 9.2 a night, and with it, two of the four versions still call the summer a plus even with him at 16 a night. That's the healthy-night question, Finch choosing him. On the other nights it's injuries choosing him, and the model, which treats a coach's-decision DNP or a G League assignment the same as an injury, gives him about 20 minutes a team game where players in his spot got 14.7. In the model, those extra minutes are worth about a win, the wrong way. The front office could have closed that question in August and chose not to.
Kuminga's option. Year two is his to decline, and the model puts the chance he does, and walks into free agency, between 0.53 and 0.84 depending on how you score him. If he's good enough to do that, Minnesota's ceiling for keeping him without cap room, on Non-Bird rights, is $7,276,800, which isn't what a good starting four costs. The best version of this signing is the one that ends with them needing to replace him.
The picks. A 2033 first, unprotected, seven years out, from a team whose best player can walk in 2029. Swap rights in 2028, 2029 and 2030. Three seconds. If the bet misses, this is the part that doesn't come back.
The apron. Minnesota sits $7,665,954 over the first apron this season, which means no taking back more salary than they send out, no bi-annual exception, no sign-and-trade. If something breaks in January, the repair is a minimum contract or a lopsided trade, and that's the whole menu.
Konchar. $2,055,000 against the cap every year through 2028-29, for a player who was a Timberwolf for an afternoon. The last of those checks clears in Anthony Edwards's walk year.
And the Saturday deadline. Taking Williams and Konchar back instead of dumping Green for nothing, assuming anyone would have taken him, cost $6,712,836 in payroll this season and about $13.7M more in tax, against the cheapest version of the same day. The Dosunmu contract forced the dump: with Ayo on the books, Dosunmu plus Green plus Kuminga sat $1,603,367 over the hard cap, and without it Kuminga could have been paid up to $8,650,557 out of the bigger mid-level, with the first apron as the wall instead of the second. What the Dosunmu contract did not force was the acquisition. Taking a former No. 10 pick back in the dump instead of nothing was a choice, and the choice was to spend tax money on a lottery ticket. I'd have made it too. I'd just like it called what it was.
The clock
Every C+ I quoted in Part 1 grades the summer against an alternative: keep Naz, keep the picks, run it back, see what happens. Reasonable. Except that alternative has a clock on it, and the clock is Anthony Edwards's contract.
He's signed through 2028-29, no options anywhere in it. The ordinary extension has been on the table since July 8, 2026, two years and about $122 million by the reports. The big one, the supermax, only opens if he makes All-NBA this season (MVP or Defensive Player of the Year would do it too), and All-NBA under the current rules takes 65 games. He played 61 last year. Four games. One of the three best scorers in the league by the counting stats, and four more regular-season appearances would have kept one of the biggest contracts in the sport on the table this past summer. Instead it's off the table for a year, and the whole question lands on this season. That isn't a footnote. It means the summer of 2027 is either the summer he signs for four more years or the summer Minnesota starts hearing what every small market hears. After that, 2028-29 is his walk year and July 2029 is free agency.
I pulled the walk-year study from the LaMelo pricing series forward, because it's the same question. Run Ant's profile through it with the Wolves winning at a .600 clip and the chance he leaves is 0.8% this season, 7.3% next season, and 44% at the cliff in 2028-29, 48% by that summer. Run it with the team sagging to .450 and the cliff is 56%, with 62% gone by 2029. And the history behind the model is blunt without any model at all: stars in a walk year on teams playing .600 or better left 31% of the time. On teams under .500, 56%.
Edwards's contract as signed, and the extension windows under the CBA, the figures as reported. The chance he leaves each season, if he hasn't already, comes from the walk-year model in the LaMelo pricing series, run on his profile with the team playing .600 or .450; hover a bar for its 80% band. The team's dates are from the contract book. This season's checkpoints are placed by game, not by date.
That's the argument. The safe summer, the one the C+ is graded against, doesn't exist. Keeping Naz and the picks and running back a second-round team doesn't get you a second-round team forever; it gets you a second-round team with a 2029 expiration date, and if the team sags while it waits, the needle moves from 31% toward 56%. My read is that Connelly didn't spend the picks because he's reckless. He spent them because the thing they were supposed to buy later might not be for sale later.
You can disagree with the bet. I don't think you can grade it against a world where the clock isn't running.
The case
Part 2 put thirteen claims about this roster through the wringer and four survived. Those four are the only claims about this team I'd put money on, and the case is built on them and nothing else.
LaMelo is the clear win. All four ways we score players agree the trade bought title equity, 0.71 points of it, before you count what Part 2 found about Ant: that the clearest measurable hole in this roster was a defense being able to erase Anthony Edwards with a single assignment. So they went and got a second creator. That isn't a vibe. That's the finding.
Two of the four survivors are bills. Naz leaving costs 0.28 points of title odds in every version of the model, and Donte's Achilles costs 0.33 by itself. Nobody chose the second one. The case has to carry both anyway.
Kuminga is probably an upgrade on whoever else would have played the four. Probably, not certainly: he comes out ahead by 0.29 points of title odds and lands on the right side of every test, just not by a margin every version of the model would sign off on. The one roster where he isn't the answer is the one where Joan Beringer is, and that's the fourth survivor: put Beringer in those minutes and the model prefers him, by a lot, in every version. If that's the problem this team has in March, I'll take that problem.
And Rudy. For the first time in his Minnesota career, Rudy Gobert is going to play with a high-usage guard who is also a high-volume passer, and the roll-man volume Rudy lost over the last two seasons is on the record. I can't model what that does. Nothing in the four ways we score players knows what happens to a rim-running center when the passer changes, because in his Minnesota years it barely has. It's the one question on this roster that's observed, not simulated, and it's the one I'm most curious about. How all of this was tested is on the methods page.
The dates
The lines, drawn before the season so nobody, including me, can move them later.
Game 20. Cody Williams's minutes, averaged over every Wolves game whether he plays or not, against the 17.3 line Part 2 drew halfway between what the model gives him and what last season's deep bench got. Over it, the model knew what it was talking about. Under it, Finch found something the model didn't, and this team is a little better than the numbers in this series say. Game 20 also carries two lines for the backcourt, read over the games each of them plays in Minnesota's first twenty: Edwards's true shooting under 0.547, or LaMelo's under 0.476, means the pairing is costing them efficiency and not just shots.
Game 30 is the model's report card, and it grades every team the model argued with Vegas about the same way: the line sits halfway between the two expectations, and whichever side a team's net rating lands on wins. Minnesota above +1.8 means Vegas had the Wolves right and I didn't. Same story for Charlotte below +1.2, Indiana above -1.4 and San Antonio above +7.3.
Then the team's own lines, and there are two sets, because a deep run and a title are different bars. The run lines come from Part 3: 14th in net rating at game 20, 9th in April. History gives a team sitting on the first one a 7.8% shot at a conference final, and a team on the second 12.5%. The title line is a different animal. Ten of the last eleven champions finished the regular season top five, and not one of the eleven was worse than 11th after twenty games, so top five in April is the bar I set for a title team before any of this tipped off.
The lines Part 4 drew before the season, at the date each is judged. The run lines are Part 3's, in net rating per 100 possessions with the yardstick's chance for a team sitting right on each; the game-30 lines are halfway between the model and Vegas; true shooting is over the player's games among Minnesota's first 20. Each line is judged once, at its own date, and stays where it was drawn. Hover a date.
Then the ones without numbers. LaMelo's games, counted on the calendar and nowhere else. Whether Beringer's leap is real or 7.9 minutes of noise. Whether Kuminga's jumper travels to a team that needs him to take it. And the locker room, which is the thing every one of these numbers is quietly assuming works, and which none of them can see.
Why you should watch
I've been a Wolves fan long enough to know the difference between a season you watch and a season you endure. The enduring kind is when the front office is waiting: for cap space, for a pick to convey, for a contract to expire, for a player to become who he was supposed to be. Nothing is decided in those seasons, so nothing is at stake, and you can feel it from the couch.
This isn't that. Connelly looked at a good team with a clock on it and decided that the safe summer was the riskiest one, and I think the clock says he was right about that even if the trade turns out wrong. The picks are spent. Every dollar is spoken for. The best player is on a contract that starts asking questions in July, and the answer to those questions is going to be written by this season, by LaMelo's ankles and Cody Williams's minutes and Rudy's hands and a second-year center and a forward who bet on himself with a player option. It's an attempt to build the team Anthony Edwards needs, made at the last moment it could be made, with everything the franchise had left to make it with.
That's a bet. It might miss. But it's the first Timberwolves season in a long time where the thing at stake is the thing you actually care about, and where the questions get answered on the floor instead of in July. That's one of the seasons you're in the building for.
See you at game 20.
Corrections
No corrections logged.